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We propose a free-space reconfigurable quantum key distribution (QKD) network to secure com-
munication among mobile users. Depends on the trustworthiness of the network relay, the users can
implement either the highly secure measurement-device-independent QKD, or the highly efficient
decoy state BB84 QKD. Based on the same quantum infrastructure, we also propose a loss tolerant
quantum position verification scheme, which could allow the QKD users to initiate the QKD process
without relying on pre-shared key.
I. INTRODUCTION
Like it or not, today’s wireless communication allows
you to be connected anytime anywhere. Comparing with
communication through optical fibers, a free-space com-
munication system is more susceptible to eavesdropping
due to the openness of the communication channel, thus
there is a more urgent need to enhance its security. Quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) [1] allows two remote users
(Alice and Bob) to generate cryptographic keys with
proven security through an insecure channel. A mobile
QKD network could bring unprecedented level of security
to wireless users.
Despite its enormous potential, mobile QKD network
has however received limited attention. Most of today’s
quantum key distribution (QKD) experiments are con-
ducted through optical fiber links, in light of the avail-
ability of worldwide optical fiber network. However, to
apply QKD in a mobile communication network, free-
space transmission seems the only viable option.
Extensive research has been conducted in free-space
QKD, aiming at building up a global QKD network by
using satellites as trusted relays [2, 3]. In those studies,
the main goal is to establish a long-distance QKD link be-
tween a stationary laboratory at the earth and a satellite
in space moving along a well-defined orbit at a relatively
small angular speed. In contrast, a mobile QKD net-
work may only cover a relatively small geographic area
but is highly dynamic in nature: both the locations of
QKD users and the corresponding accessible network re-
lays are time dependent. In this case, the trustworthiness
of the network relay may be questionable. Furthermore,
as the QKD users may frequently move among different
networks, a secure authentication scheme without relying
on pre-shared key is highly desired.
In the paper, we propose a free-space reconfig-
urable QKD network based on the recently discovered
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD protocol
∗ qib1@ornl.gov
[4]. The MDI-QKD is an ideal building block for multi-
user QKD network, since the most expensive and vulner-
able measurement device can be placed in an untrusted
network relay and be shared by many QKD users. An-
other advantage of our proposal is its reconfigurability:
depending on the trustworthiness of the network relay,
the QKD users can implement either the highly secure
MDI-QKD or the highly efficient decoy-state BB84 QKD
[5–7]. This feature is especially appealing when the mea-
surement device is implemented with low-efficiency detec-
tors. Furthermore, based on the same quantum infras-
tructure, we also propose a loss-tolerant quantum posi-
tion verification scheme secure against “local” quantum
adversaries, which could allow a legitimate party to use
its geographical location as its only credential to establish
an authenticated channel.
II. MEASUREMENT-DEVICE-INDEPENDENT
(MDI) QKD
Idealized QKD protocols have been proved to be un-
conditionally secure against adversaries with unlimited
computing power and technological capabilities. How-
ever, real-life implementations of QKD rarely conform
to the assumptions in idealized models used in the secu-
rity proofs. Indeed, by exploiting security loopholes in
practical realizations, especially imperfections in the de-
tectors, several attacks have been successfully launched
against commercial QKD systems [8–10]. Compared with
an optical fiber link, a free-space optical link is more vul-
nerable, in the sense that it is much more easily accessi-
ble via physical means. This suggests that a free-space
QKD system could be more vulnerable to side-channel
attacks. For example, in the same spirit as the time-shift
attack [11], an eavesdropper can implement a “space-
shift” attack by simply manipulating the spatial mode of
the quantum signal, as first proposed in [12] and demon-
strated recently in [13].
In a conventional QKD protocol (see Fig.1a), Alice pre-
pares quantum signals and Bob performs measurement.
In this case, the errors in quantum state preparation
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2can be well controlled and quantified, since this can be
done within the Alice’s well-protected laboratory with-
out Eve’s interference. On the other hand, the quantum
states received by the measurement device are highly un-
predictable, since Eve can replace the original quantum
states with anything at her will. This makes the mea-
surement device the most vulnerable part is the whole
QKD system.
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FIG. 1: (a) Conventional QKD; (b)
Measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD
The motivation behind MDI-QKD is to develop a QKD
protocol which is automatically immune to all detector
side-channel attacks. In fact, the measurement device in
the MDI-QKD can be treated as a “black box” which
could even be manufactured and operated by the eaves-
dropper. In this scheme (see Fig.1b), both Alice and Bob
prepare BB84 [14] quantum states and send them to an
untrusted third party, Charlie, who performs Bell state
measurement and publicly announces the measurement
results. Given Charlie’s measurement results, Alice and
Bob can further establish a secure key. The security of
MDI-QKD is based on the idea of time-reversed EPR
QKD [15, 16]: a successful Bell state measurement at
Charlie projects Alice and Bob’s photons into an EPR
state. If Charlie executes the protocol honestly, he can-
not gain any information of the secure key. On the other
hand, any attempts by Charlie to gain information of the
secure key will destroy the quantum correlation expected
from an EPR state and thus can be detected by Alice and
Bob.
MDI-QKD is an ideal building block of mobile QKD
networks, since the most expensive measurement device
can be placed inside a network relay while each QKD
user only needs a low-cost transmitter. In fact, the re-
cent progresses in chip-scale QKD [17] suggest that a
QKD transmitter could be fitted into compact mobile
devices such as smart phones. This could allow a QKD
user to use a simple handhold transmitter to generate
quantum key for cryptographic purposes. Furthermore,
since the security does not rely on the trustworthiness
of the network relays, the QKD users can optimize key
distribution route based on their locations without com-
promising the security. This protocol is highly practical
and can be implemented with off-the-shelf components.
Up-to-date, MDI-QKD has been demonstrated over 200
km telecom fiber link [18] and a quantum channel with
60 dB loss [19].
MDI-QKD completely removes any potential security
loopholes on the detector side, so the remaining ques-
tion is how to quantify imperfections at the source and
take them into account in the security proof. A promis-
ing solution is the loss-tolerant protocol [20] proposed by
Tamaki et al., which makes QKD tolerable to channel
loss in the presence of source flaws. Recently, the loss-
tolerant protocol has been applied into a MDI-QKD ex-
perimental demonstration [21]. Combined with existing
countermeasures against Trojan-horse attack [22], this
approach could lead to practical side-channel-free QKD.
Although the above MDI-QKD experiments were con-
ducted through optical fiber links, there are no fun-
damental roadblocks in its free-space application. Es-
pecially, polarization encoding scheme, the most favor-
able choice for free-space QKD, has been demonstrated
in a complete MDI-QKD experiment [23]. Nonetheless,
a number of research opportunities/challenges do exist.
For example, owing to the atmospheric turbulence, the
time synchronization and mode matching of two sepa-
rate free-space channels with respect to a common relay,
Charlie, might be non-trivial and may lead to a substan-
tial reduction in the transmittance and an increase in
quantum bit error rate. Procedures for time synchro-
nization and mode matching may need to be developed
to overcome these challenges.
III. FREE-SPACE RECONFIGURABLE QKD
NETWORK
MDI-QKD can significantly improve the security of
practical QKD. The price to pay is the relatively low key
generation rate when implemented with low-efficiency de-
tectors. In conventional QKD, such as the decoy state
BB84 protocol, the secure key rate is approximately pro-
portional to the detector efficiency. On the other hand, in
MDI-QKD, secure keys are generated from two-fold co-
incidence detection events, the secure key rate is approx-
imately proportional to the square of detector efficiency.
So the MDI-QKD suffers more from the low detection
efficiency of conventional single photon detector. We re-
mark that high-efficiency superconducting nanowire sin-
gle photon detector (SNSPD) is commercially available
[24]. If such high-efficient detectors are used, as discussed
in [25], the key rate of MDI-QKD can be high enough for
metropolitan network application.
Another challenge in free-space MDI-QKD, which has
been briefly discussed in previous section, is how to match
the temporal and spatial modes of photons from different
users. To achieve a high interference visibility in Bell
3state measurement (thus a high secure key rate in MDI-
QKD), photons from two QKD users should be highly
indistinguishable. Given the atmospheric turbulence acts
independently in the two quantum channels, it could be
very challenging to match the arrival times and spatial
modes of photons propagated through two independent
free-space channels precisely.
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FIG. 2: (a) MDI-QKD implemented with an untrusted
network relay; (b) BB84 QKD implmented with a
trusted network relay. BS-Beamsplitter; PBS-Polarizing
beamsplitter; WP-Waveplate.
To alleviate the above problems, we propose a reconfig-
urable QKD which can easily switch between the highly
secure MDI-QKD and the highly efficiency decoy state
BB84 QKD: when the QKD users move into an untrusted
network, they can implement MDI-QKD protocol using
the measurement device in an untrusted network relay, as
shown in Fig.2a. On the other hand, whenever the net-
work relay can be fully trusted, the QKD users can use
the trusted relay to implement decoy state BB84 proto-
col: each QKD user generates a secure key with the relay
independently. After that, the network relay can estab-
lish a secure channel with Bob by using the key shared
with Bob to implement one-time-pad and convey the key
shared with Alice to Bob. As shown in Fig.2, the above
two protocols can be implemented using the same hard-
ware design. To switch from the MDI-QKD to the decoy
state BB84, the network relay can simply delay the pho-
tons from one user to make sure photons from different
users hit the beam splitter at different times. He can also
rotate a wave plate to change the polarization measure-
ment basis, as shown in Fig.2b. By providing the users
with the flexibility of implementing multiple protocols on
the same platform, the above QKD network design could
be fit into many practical applications.
IV. LOSS TOLERANT QUANTUM POSITION
VERIFICATION
According to special relativity, information cannot be
transmitted at a speed faster than the speed of light in
vacuum. This fundamental constrain can open the door
to novel applications in free space line of sight optical
communications. One potential application is the posi-
tion based cryptography (PBC), where a legitimate user
can use its geographical location as the only credential to
implement various cryptographic protocols [26]. A posi-
tion based authentication scheme may allow QKD users
to establish a classical authenticated channel without us-
ing pre-shared key. Such a protocol could be very useful
in a mobile QKD network where the users may frequently
switch between different networks.
The basic task of PBC is position verification, where
a prover P tries to convince a group of trusted verifiers
that he/she is at the claimed location. Intuitively, po-
sition verification can be implemented as follows: each
verifier sends one piece of information to P and the veri-
fiers coordinate their transmission time to make sure that
P receives all the information simultaneously. The prover
P performs certain operations/calculations using the in-
formation from the verifiers and reports the result back.
If all the verifiers receive the correct answer at the time
consistent with the claimed location, the location of P is
accepted as authenticated.
Unfortunately, it was shown in [27] that all the clas-
sical position verification protocols (where each verifier
can only send classical information to P ) are vulnera-
ble to attacks from a coalition of adversaries possessing
only classical communication channels: each adversary
can intercept the classical information sent by the near-
est verifier and forward a perfect copy of the intercepted
information to each of his/her partners. After collect-
ing all the information, each adversary can perform the
operations/calculations expected from P and report the
result to the nearest verifier.
Quantum position verification (QPV) protocols, where
the verifiers are allowed to send quantum information
to P , have been developed with the hope to achieve
information-theoretic security [26, 28–32]. On one hand,
it has been shown that a QPV protocol can be uncondi-
tionally secure under attacks of a coalition of adversaries
limited to local operations and classical communications;
on the other hand, it has also been shown that any PBQC
protocols are breakable if the adversaries have unlimited
quantum resources, such as entanglement [26]. It is an
active research topic to study the security of QPV pro-
tocols under attacks of adversaries with limited quantum
resources [33–36], a more relevant scenario in practice.
Inspired by MDI-QKD, we propose a QPV protocol
based on Bell state measurement [37]. This protocol can
be implemented using the same setup for MDI-QKD and
thus can be easily integrated into the proposed free-space
QKD network. This protocol is also loss-tolerant, an im-
portant advantage in practical applications [38]. For sim-
4plicity, we consider the one-dimensional case with two
verifiers, V0 and V1, and a prover P is in between. The
basic procedures of the proposed PBQC protocol are as
follows:
1. Through a private channel, the verifiers V0 and V1
agree on random bits x0, x1, θ ∈ {0, 1}. V0 prepares
a qubit in the state,
|ψ0〉 = Hθ|x0〉, (1)
where |0〉 and |1〉 are computational basis states,
and H is the Hadamard matrix. Similarly, V1 pre-
pares a qubit in the state,
|ψ1〉 = Hθ|x1〉. (2)
Note, in our scheme, V0 and V1 choose encoding
basis randomly and collaboratively.
2. V0 (V1) sends |ψ0〉 (|ψ1〉) to P through a free-space
quantum channel. V0 and V1 coordinate their trans-
mission times to make sure that |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 arrive
at P at the same time.
3. As soon as |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 arrive, P performs a Bell-
state measurement. If P detects a Bell-state suc-
cessfully, he broadcasts the measurement result to
V0 and V1 immediately through free-space classical
communication channels. Otherwise, he reports no
detection.
4. If the verifiers receive the measurement results at a
time inconsistent with the position of P , the pro-
tocol fails and will be terminated.
5. Through an authenticated classical channel, V0 and
V1 compare the reported measurement results re-
ceived by them. If they receive different results,
the protocol fails and will be terminated.
As noted in [32], noisy operation in the honest case
do not produce inconsistent results between differ-
ent verifiers. This is because the classical commu-
nication channels used by P to broadcast the mea-
surement results are virtually noiseless. By com-
paring the results received by V0 and V1, we can
further limit the adversaries’ power [38].
6. V0, V1 and P repeat the above procedures many
times. They calculate the error rate ER, which is
defined as the probability that the reported mea-
surement result is inconsistent with the quantum
states transmitted. If ER is below a predetermined
value, the location of P is accepted as authenti-
cated.
Like previous QPV protocols, the proposed QPV pro-
tocol based on Bell state measurement is insecure if the
adversaries share entanglement or they possess quantum
communication channels (which allows them to exchange
quantum signals, such as EPR state). In appendix A,
we provide an intuitive security analysis under attacks
of a coalition of adversaries limited to local operations
and classical communications (A more detailed security
proof under the same assumptions will appear in forth-
coming publication). By introducing decoy state, we ex-
pect that the above protocol can be implemented with
practical weak coherent sources and realistic detectors
without sacrificing its performance, as the case of MDI-
QKD. To extend this protocol into 2 or 3 dimensional
spaces, we could introduce more verifiers to detect the
classical measurement results broadcast by the prover,
as shown in Fig.3: two verifiers send BB84 photons to P ,
who performs Bell measurement and broadcast the mea-
surement results through free-space classical communica-
tion channels. If all the three verifiers receive the same
measurement result at times consistent with the position
of P and the measurement result is consistent with the
quantum states transmitted, the location of P is accepted
as authenticated.
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V. OUTLOOK
In light of the availability of worldwide optical fiber
network, most of QKD experiments are conducted
through optical fiber links. In practice, there is also an
urgent need to secure communication in mobile networks.
Here we propose a free-space reconfigurable mobile QKD
network based on loss-tolerant MDI-QKD protocol. We
expect such a solution will find wide applications in the
future.
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Appendix A: Towards a loss tolerant QPV scheme
assuming LOCC adversaries
For simplicity, we consider the one-dimensional case
with two verifiers, V0 and V1, and a prover P in between.
There are two adversaries, E0 (between V0 and P ) and
E1 (between V1 and P ).
Like previous QPV protocols, the proposed QPV pro-
tocol based on Bell state measurement is insecure if the
adversaries share entanglement or they possess quantum
communication channels (which allows them to exchange
quantum signals, such as EPR state), as highlighted by
the attack below:
Suppose for simplicity that only the Bell state |Ψ+〉
will be reported by the honest P . If E0 and E1 pre-
share an EPR pair in the state |Ψ+〉, they can launch
the following attack:
(1)As soon as E0 (E1) intercepts the photon from V0
(V1), she performs a Bell measurement on it and the pho-
ton of the EPR pair in her possession.
(2)E0 (E1) sends her (classical) Bell measurement re-
sults to E1 (E0).
(3) If both of them detect |Ψ+〉, E0 (E1) reports the
measurement results to V0 (V1). Otherwise, they claim
no detection.
Evidently, the above attack will not introduce any er-
rors and thus cannot be detected when the expected de-
tection rate from P is low.
Here we consider a weaker security model in which
the adversaries are restricted to local quantum operations
and classical communication (LOCC). This choice of se-
curity model allows us to establish security bounds that
are loss-independent, however they are not valid against
more general attacks. Nevertheless, we believe that the
LOCC security model is still of practical interest, espe-
cially in environments whereby reliable distribution of
entanglement is challenging.
We first introduce an entanglement-based PBQC pro-
tocol which is equivalent to the prepare-and-measure pro-
tocol presented in the main text. In the entanglement-
based protocol, both V0 and V1 hold perfect Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) photon pairs. Through a private
channel, V0 and V1 agree on a randomly chosen basis
(either the computational basis or the diagonal basis).
Each of them measures one photon of the EPR at hand
in the chosen basis, records the measurement result, and
sends the other photon to P . The rest steps are the
same as the prepare-and-measure protocol presented in
the main text. From the adversaries’ point of view, they
cannot distinguish the entanglement-based protocol from
the prepare-and-measure PBQC protocol.
Since the measurements performed by V0 and V1 com-
mute with the Bell-state measurement by P (or the mea-
surements preformed by the adversaries), we can switch
their order and delay the measurements at V0 and V1 till
the end of the protocol. In this picture, a general attack
under the LOCC model is as follows: E0 (E1) intercepts
half of V0 (V1)’s EPR pair, performs an optimal measure-
ment, and forwards the (classical) measurement results
to E1 (E0). Based on the measurement results acquired
by both E0 and E1, they follow a pre-determined strategy
to either report a specific Bell state or claim no detection.
Their goal is to minimize the error rate.
Since we are allowed to delay the measurements per-
formed by V0 and V1, right after E0 (E1)’s measurement,
the photon possessed by V0 and V1 will be projected
into certain quantum states about which the adversaries
may have partial or complete information. Here we as-
sume that by post-selecting the favorable cases based on
their measurement results, the adversaries can prepare
the photon at V0 (V1)’s hand into any pure state at their
will. This is the most-favorable assumption for the ad-
versaries, which may or may not be achievable.
Without the loss of generality, we assume that E0 and
E1 will report a Bell state |Ψ−〉 when they prepare the
joint state at V0 and V1 as
|ϕ〉 = (α0|0〉+ β0|1〉)V0 ⊗ (α1|0〉+ β1|1〉)V1 , (A1)
where |α0|2 + |β0|2 = |α1|2 + |β1|2 = 1.
Suppose V0 and V1 measure photons at their hands in
either the computational or diagonal basis with the same
probability. It is straightforward to show the error rate
in the computational basis (which is the probability that
V0 and V1 have the same measurement result) is given by
ER1 = |α0α1|2 + |β0β1|2. (A2)
In the diagonal basis, the joint state at V0 and V1 is
given by
|ϕ〉 = 1
2
[(α0 + β0)|+〉+ (α0 − β0)|−〉]V0
⊗[(α1 + β1)|+〉+ (α1 − β1)|−〉]V1 . (A3)
So the error rate in the diagonal basis (which is the
probability that V0 and V1 have the same measurement
result) is given by
ER2 =
1
4
{|(α0 + β0)(α1 + β1)|2 + |(α0 − β0)(α1 − β1)|2}.
(A4)
After some algebraic manipulation, the average error
rate can be expressed as
ER =
ER1 + ER2
2
=
1 + |(α0α1 + β0β1)|2 + |(α0α∗1 + β0β∗1)|2
4
.(A5)
Obviously, the minimum average error rate introduce
by the above attack is 25%. This result is remarkable
since as long as the intrinsic error rate of a PBQC system
is below 25%, the location of P can be authenticated
regardless the overall loss. The suggests that our protocol
is loss-tolerant.
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